Agent Safety

• Notes: safety for agent LLM

Jailbreaking Safety

Required Readings: RISK, SAFETY, Evaluation & GUARDRAILS

Core Component: Agent Safety Systems - Ensuring Reliable, Ethical, and Secure Operation

Addressing safety, alignment, and ethical considerations in agent deployment.

Topic	Slide Deck	Previous Semester
Platform - Model Jailbreaking / Safeguarding	W7.1-team3-jailbreak	25course
Platform - VLM Jailbreaking / Probing	W7.2-team4-MMJailbreak-garak	25course
Agent Safety	W10.2-team4-agent-safety	25course
LLM Evaluating Framework	W3-LLMEvaluation-Team5	24course
GenAI Guardrails	W3-Guardrail-Team3	24course
Survey: Human Alignment	W4-LLM-Human-Alignment	24course
Survey: AI Risk Framework	W5-AI-RiskFramework	24course
FM Copyright Infringement	W5-FM-copyright-infrigement	24course
FM Privacy Leakage Issues	W6-FM-privacy-leakage	24course
FM Fairness / Bias Issues	W6-LLM-Bias-Fairness-Team5	24course
FM Toxicity / Harmful Outputs	W7-LLM-harm	24course
LLM Multimodal Harm Responses	W7-multimodal-LLMharm	24course
More FM Risk / Extra - Agent Guardrailing	W8-Team3-P3-moreRisk.pdf	25course

More Readings:

The Emerged Security and Privacy of LLM Agent: A Survey with Case Studies

• [Submitted on 28 Jul 2024]
• Feng He, Tianqing Zhu, Dayong Ye, Bo Liu, Wanlei Zhou, Philip S. Yu Inspired by the rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs), LLM agents have evolved to perform complex tasks. LLM agents are now extensively applied across various domains, handling vast amounts of data to interact with humans and execute tasks. The widespread applications of LLM agents demonstrate their significant commercial value; however, they also expose security and privacy vulnerabilities. At the current stage, comprehensive research on the security and privacy of LLM agents is highly needed. This survey aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the newly emerged privacy and security issues faced by LLM agents. We begin by introducing the fundamental knowledge of LLM agents, followed by a categorization and analysis of the threats. We then discuss the impacts of these threats on humans, environment, and other agents. Subsequently, we review existing defensive strategies, and finally explore future trends. Additionally, the survey incorporates diverse case studies to facilitate a more accessible understanding. By highlighting these critical security and privacy issues, the survey seeks to stimulate future research towards enhancing the security and privacy of LLM agents, thereby increasing their reliability and trustworthiness in future applications.

Safety Fine-Tuning at (Almost) No Cost: A Baseline for Vision Large Language Models

• Yongshuo Zong, Ondrej Bohdal, Tingyang Yu, Yongxin Yang, Timothy Hospedales
• [Submitted on 3 Feb 2024 (v1), last revised 17 Jun 2024 (this version, v2)]
• Current vision large language models (VLLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities yet are prone to generate harmful content and are vulnerable to even the simplest jailbreaking attacks. Our initial analysis finds that this is due to the presence of harmful data during vision-language instruction fine-tuning, and that VLLM fine-tuning can cause forgetting of safety alignment previously learned by the underpinning LLM. To address this issue, we first curate a vision-language safe instruction-following dataset VLGuard covering various harmful categories. Our experiments demonstrate that integrating this dataset into standard vision-language fine-tuning or utilizing it for post-hoc fine-tuning effectively safety aligns VLLMs. This alignment is achieved with minimal impact on, or even enhancement of, the models’ helpfulness. The versatility of our safety fine-tuning dataset makes it a valuable resource for safety-testing existing VLLMs, training new models or safeguarding pre-trained VLLMs. Empirical results demonstrate that fine-tuned VLLMs effectively reject unsafe instructions and substantially reduce the success rates of several black-box adversarial attacks, which approach zero in many cases. The code and dataset are available at this https URL.

Unique Security and Privacy Threats of Large Language Model: A Comprehensive Survey

• [Submitted on 12 Jun 2024 (v1), last revised 18 Jun 2024 (this version, v2)]
• Shang Wang, Tianqing Zhu, Bo Liu, Ming Ding, Xu Guo, Dayong Ye, Wanlei Zhou, Philip S. Yu
• With the rapid development of artificial intelligence, large language models (LLMs) have made remarkable advancements in natural language processing. These models are trained on vast datasets to exhibit powerful language understanding and generation capabilities across various applications, including machine translation, chatbots, and agents. However, LLMs have revealed a variety of privacy and security issues throughout their life cycle, drawing significant academic and industrial attention. Moreover, the risks faced by LLMs differ significantly from those encountered by traditional language models. Given that current surveys lack a clear taxonomy of unique threat models across diverse scenarios, we emphasize the unique privacy and security threats associated with five specific scenarios: pre-training, fine-tuning, retrieval-augmented generation systems, deployment, and LLM-based agents. Addressing the characteristics of each risk, this survey outlines potential threats and countermeasures. Research on attack and defense situations can offer feasible research directions, enabling more areas to benefit from LLMs.

Large Language Model Safety: A Holistic Survey

• Dan Shi, Tianhao Shen, Yufei Huang, Zhigen Li, Yongqi Leng, Renren Jin, Chuang Liu, Xinwei Wu, Zishan Guo, Linhao Yu, Ling Shi, Bojian Jiang, Deyi Xiong
• [Submitted on 23 Dec 2024]
• The rapid development and deployment of large language models (LLMs) have introduced a new frontier in artificial intelligence, marked by unprecedented capabilities in natural language understanding and generation. However, the increasing integration of these models into critical applications raises substantial safety concerns, necessitating a thorough examination of their potential risks and associated mitigation strategies. This survey provides a comprehensive overview of the current landscape of LLM safety, covering four major categories: value misalignment, robustness to adversarial attacks, misuse, and autonomous AI risks. In addition to the comprehensive review of the mitigation methodologies and evaluation resources on these four aspects, we further explore four topics related to LLM safety: the safety implications of LLM agents, the role of interpretability in enhancing LLM safety, the technology roadmaps proposed and abided by a list of AI companies and institutes for LLM safety, and AI governance aimed at LLM safety with discussions on international cooperation, policy proposals, and prospective regulatory directions. Our findings underscore the necessity for a proactive, multifaceted approach to LLM safety, emphasizing the integration of technical solutions, ethical considerations, and robust governance frameworks. This survey is intended to serve as a foundational resource for academy researchers, industry practitioners, and policymakers, offering insights into the challenges and opportunities associated with the safe integration of LLMs into society. Ultimately, it seeks to contribute to the safe and beneficial development of LLMs, aligning with the overarching goal of harnessing AI for societal advancement and well-being. A curated list of related papers has been publicly available at this https URL.

MobileSafetyBench: Evaluating Safety of Autonomous Agents in Mobile Device Control

• https://arxiv.org/pdf/2410.17520
• [Submitted on 23 Oct 2024 (v1), last revised 10 Dec 2024 (this version, v2)]
• Juyong Lee, Dongyoon Hahm, June Suk Choi, W. Bradley Knox, Kimin Lee
• Autonomous agents powered by large language models (LLMs) show promising potential in assistive tasks across various domains, including mobile device control. As these agents interact directly with personal information and device settings, ensuring their safe and reliable behavior is crucial to prevent undesirable outcomes. However, no benchmark exists for standardized evaluation of the safety of mobile device-control agents. In this work, we introduce MobileSafetyBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the safety of device-control agents within a realistic mobile environment based on Android emulators. We develop a diverse set of tasks involving interactions with various mobile applications, including messaging and banking applications, challenging agents with managing risks encompassing misuse and negative side effects. These tasks include tests to evaluate the safety of agents in daily scenarios as well as their robustness against indirect prompt injection attacks. Our experiments demonstrate that baseline agents, based on state-of-the-art LLMs, often fail to effectively prevent harm while performing the tasks. To mitigate these safety concerns, we propose a prompting method that encourages agents to prioritize safety considerations. While this method shows promise in promoting safer behaviors, there is still considerable room for improvement to fully earn user trust. This highlights the urgent need for continued research to develop more robust safety mechanisms in mobile environments. We open-source our benchmark at: this https URL.

Privacy-Preserving Large Language Models: Mechanisms, Applications, and Future Directions

• Guoshenghui Zhao, Eric Song
• [Submitted on 9 Dec 2024]
• The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has revolutionized natural language processing, enabling applications in diverse domains such as healthcare, finance and education. However, the growing reliance on extensive data for training and inference has raised significant privacy concerns, ranging from data leakage to adversarial attacks. This survey comprehensively explores the landscape of privacy-preserving mechanisms tailored for LLMs, including differential privacy, federated learning, cryptographic protocols, and trusted execution environments. We examine their efficacy in addressing key privacy challenges, such as membership inference and model inversion attacks, while balancing trade-offs between privacy and model utility. Furthermore, we analyze privacy-preserving applications of LLMs in privacy-sensitive domains, highlighting successful implementations and inherent limitations. Finally, this survey identifies emerging research directions, emphasizing the need for novel frameworks that integrate privacy by design into the lifecycle of LLMs. By synthesizing state-of-the-art approaches and future trends, this paper provides a foundation for developing robust, privacy-preserving large language models that safeguard sensitive information without compromising performance.

Bag of Tricks: Benchmarking of Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs

• Zhao Xu, Fan Liu, Hao Liu
• [Submitted on 13 Jun 2024 (v1), last revised 6 Nov 2024 (this version, v3)]
• Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant capabilities in executing complex tasks in a zero-shot manner, they are susceptible to jailbreak attacks and can be manipulated to produce harmful outputs. Recently, a growing body of research has categorized jailbreak attacks into token-level and prompt-level attacks. However, previous work primarily overlooks the diverse key factors of jailbreak attacks, with most studies concentrating on LLM vulnerabilities and lacking exploration of defense-enhanced LLMs. To address these issues, we introduced JailTrickBench to evaluate the impact of various attack settings on LLM performance and provide a baseline for jailbreak attacks, encouraging the adoption of a standardized evaluation framework. Specifically, we evaluate the eight key factors of implementing jailbreak attacks on LLMs from both target-level and attack-level perspectives. We further conduct seven representative jailbreak attacks on six defense methods across two widely used datasets, encompassing approximately 354 experiments with about 55,000 GPU hours on A800-80G. Our experimental results highlight the need for standardized benchmarking to evaluate these attacks on defense-enhanced LLMs. Our code is available at this https URL.

Jailbreak Attacks and Defenses Against Large Language Models: A Survey

• Sibo Yi, Yule Liu, Zhen Sun, Tianshuo Cong, Xinlei He, Jiaxing Song, Ke Xu, Qi Li
• [Submitted on 5 Jul 2024 (v1), last revised 30 Aug 2024 (this version, v2)]
• Large Language Models (LLMs) have performed exceptionally in various text-generative tasks, including question answering, translation, code completion, etc. However, the over-assistance of LLMs has raised the challenge of “jailbreaking”, which induces the model to generate malicious responses against the usage policy and society by designing adversarial prompts. With the emergence of jailbreak attack methods exploiting different vulnerabilities in LLMs, the corresponding safety alignment measures are also evolving. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive and detailed taxonomy of jailbreak attack and defense methods. For instance, the attack methods are divided into black-box and white-box attacks based on the transparency of the target model. Meanwhile, we classify defense methods into prompt-level and model-level defenses. Additionally, we further subdivide these attack and defense methods into distinct sub-classes and present a coherent diagram illustrating their relationships. We also conduct an investigation into the current evaluation methods and compare them from different perspectives. Our findings aim to inspire future research and practical implementations in safeguarding LLMs against adversarial attacks. Above all, although jailbreak remains a significant concern within the community, we believe that our work enhances the understanding of this domain and provides a foundation for developing more secure LLMs.

Safeguarding Large Language Models: A Survey

• [Submitted on 3 Jun 2024]
• Yi Dong, Ronghui Mu, Yanghao Zhang, Siqi Sun, Tianle Zhang, Changshun Wu, Gaojie Jin, Yi Qi, Jinwei Hu, Jie Meng, Saddek Bensalem, Xiaowei Huang
• In the burgeoning field of Large Language Models (LLMs), developing a robust safety mechanism, colloquially known as “safeguards” or “guardrails”, has become imperative to ensure the ethical use of LLMs within prescribed boundaries. This article provides a systematic literature review on the current status of this critical mechanism. It discusses its major challenges and how it can be enhanced into a comprehensive mechanism dealing with ethical issues in various contexts. First, the paper elucidates the current landscape of safeguarding mechanisms that major LLM service providers and the open-source community employ. This is followed by the techniques to evaluate, analyze, and enhance some (un)desirable properties that a guardrail might want to enforce, such as hallucinations, fairness, privacy, and so on. Based on them, we review techniques to circumvent these controls (i.e., attacks), to defend the attacks, and to reinforce the guardrails. While the techniques mentioned above represent the current status and the active research trends, we also discuss several challenges that cannot be easily dealt with by the methods and present our vision on how to implement a comprehensive guardrail through the full consideration of multi-disciplinary approach, neural-symbolic method, and systems development lifecycle.

Jailbreaking LLM-Controlled Robots

• [Submitted on 17 Oct 2024 (v1), last revised 9 Nov 2024 (this version, v2)]
• Alexander Robey, Zachary Ravichandran, Vijay Kumar, Hamed Hassani, George J. Pappas
• The recent introduction of large language models (LLMs) has revolutionized the field of robotics by enabling contextual reasoning and intuitive human-robot interaction in domains as varied as manipulation, locomotion, and self-driving vehicles. When viewed as a stand-alone technology, LLMs are known to be vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks, wherein malicious prompters elicit harmful text by bypassing LLM safety guardrails. To assess the risks of deploying LLMs in robotics, in this paper, we introduce RoboPAIR, the first algorithm designed to jailbreak LLM-controlled robots. Unlike existing, textual attacks on LLM chatbots, RoboPAIR elicits harmful physical actions from LLM-controlled robots, a phenomenon we experimentally demonstrate in three scenarios: (i) a white-box setting, wherein the attacker has full access to the NVIDIA Dolphins self-driving LLM, (ii) a gray-box setting, wherein the attacker has partial access to a Clearpath Robotics Jackal UGV robot equipped with a GPT-4o planner, and (iii) a black-box setting, wherein the attacker has only query access to the GPT-3.5-integrated Unitree Robotics Go2 robot dog. In each scenario and across three new datasets of harmful robotic actions, we demonstrate that RoboPAIR, as well as several static baselines, finds jailbreaks quickly and effectively, often achieving 100% attack success rates. Our results reveal, for the first time, that the risks of jailbroken LLMs extend far beyond text generation, given the distinct possibility that jailbroken robots could cause physical damage in the real world. Indeed, our results on the Unitree Go2 represent the first successful jailbreak of a deployed commercial robotic system. Addressing this emerging vulnerability is critical for ensuring the safe deployment of LLMs in robotics. Additional media is available at: this https URL

Model Tampering Attacks Enable More Rigorous Evaluations of LLM Capabilities

• Zora Che, Stephen Casper, Robert Kirk, Anirudh Satheesh, Stewart Slocum, Lev E McKinney, Rohit Gandikota, Aidan Ewart, Domenic Rosati, Zichu Wu, Zikui Cai, Bilal Chughtai, Yarin Gal, Furong Huang, Dylan Hadfield-Menell
• Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model’s worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at this https URL